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FRIENDLY v. HOSTILE FIRES
By GEORGE P. SMITH. II*
What is fire? This is the central question in the discussion of
the friendly-hostile fire doctrine. Since fire is defined differently
by the historian, the scientist, the layman, the economist, the law-
yer and the insurance agent, it becomes necessary to consider these
viewpoints separately and hopefully seek to clarify the existing
differences. After completing this undertaking, it then becomes
necessary to discuss the historical evolution of the doctrine with
particular emphasis being placed upon a careful disection of the
early English case of Austin v. Drew1 which first introduced the
principles embodied in the doctrine and the American case of
Way v. Abbington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 2 which later coined the
term, "friendly-hostile fire." The various divergent approaches
taken by the courts concerning the doctrine will subsequently be
viewed. Broadly generalized and inconsistent judicial policies
in the area greatly impede the effective and uniform pursuit of
logical remedies to the problem.
The five major ways to meet and resolve the difficulties which
are manifest as a result of recognition of the friendly-hostile fire
doctrine may be listed as: abolition of the very doctrine itself;
adoption of a workable definition of fire damage rather than per-
sistence in attempting to define fire; re-examination and subse-
quent application of the rule enunciated in Austin v. Drew as a
rule of construction to aid in the determination of the probable
intention of the parties when the insurance contract was entered
into, instead of a rule of law limiting the insurer's liability; ex-
tension of the application of the doctrine by considering the loca-
tion of the fire and whether in fact it was excessive or unsuitable
for its intended purposes; widespread legislative action by the
states for the addition of deduction clauses to standard fire insur-
ance policies forcing the insured to pay for all losses under a
specified amount and the insurer to pay all losses over a specific
amount.
The chief purpose of this article, then, is to assay the general
area of fire insurance law which directly concerns the use and
application of the friendly-hostile fire doctrine and to consider the
validity of the remedies offered to correct the present stature of
the doctrine and make them conform to sound legal principles.
* B.S., 1961, Indiana Univ.; J.D., 1964, Indiana Univ.; member, In-
diana Bar; instructor, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B. 1815), aff'd, 6 Taunt. 436, 128
Eng. Rep. 1014 (C.P. 1816).
2. 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
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WHAT Is FIRE?
To the scientist of today, fire is simply defined as a chemical
reaction or rapid combustion as such when oxygen unites with an
oxidizable substance and thereby forms a chemical compound.
So it is, then, that fire implies flame or ignition and is accom-
panied by the liberation of heat and light to a degree which is
readily perceptible.3 The layman, however, might glibly reply,
where there is smoke, there is fire.4
The economist, steeped in the theories and philosophies of
notable men in his field, would look upon fire as being an irregu-
lar, devastating, and generally unpredictable oxidation; a type of
occurrence that a prudent and conscientious businessman would
insure against, as distinguished from decay and slower forms of
oxidation which are normally charged off to depreciation. " This
rather indefinite concept which the economist espouses, has not
been embraced by lawyers. On the contrary, the law has gen-
erally tended to accept the scientific (chemical) definiton as a
working rule.6 Consequently, a spontaneous combustion unaccom-
panied by heat and light, is not considered to be a fire within the
meaning of a fire policy.7
3. See Abbott, The Meaning of Fire in an Insurance Policy Against
Loss by Fire, 28 HARV. L. REV. 119, 122 (1910); Ackerman, What Is a "Fire"
-An Insurance Definition, 2 U. NEWARK L. REV. 111 (1937); Note, What Is
a Fire Loss, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1420 (1941).
4. WEBSTER, NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 312 (1954).
5. See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 337 (1929).
6. In Babcock v. Montgomery Ins. Co., 6 Barb. 637 (N.Y .1849), aff'd,
4 N.Y. 326 (1850), the court held that there was no damage by fire when
lightning strikes without igniting some oxidizable substance.
Unless therefore there be actual ignition, the insurers are not liable.
Not that the identical property to which the damage occurred
should be consumed or even ignited, but there must be a fire or
burning which is the proximate cause. It is immaterial how intense
the heat may be; unless it be the effect of ignition, it is not within
the terms of the policy.
Id. at 638. Accord, Case v. Insurance Co., 13 Ill. 673 (1852); Kenniston v.
Merrimack Ins. Co., 14 N.H. 341 (1843). But see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 636 (Supp. 1964) (lightning damage covered whether or not fire ensues).
7. Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Northern Assoc. Co., 139 Fed. 637
(8th Cir. 1905). Here bundles of wool became wet and were destroyed by
a spontaneous combustion. At no time, however, was there a visible glow
or flame. Since glow, flame or ignition was thought to be an essential
element of fire, the combustion was not a fire within the meaning of the
fire insurance policy.
The courts have consistently held that before "fire" exists there must
be a visible aurora and flame or light, which have resulted from ignition.
H. Schumacher Oil Works, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1957); Security Ins. Co. v. Choctaw Oil Co., 149 Okla. 140, 299 Pac. 882
(1931); City of N.Y. Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim, 7 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928). Cf. Sun Ins. Office v. Western Co., 72 Kan. 41 (1905).
There are cases holding that excessive heat is sufficient for the existence
of a "fire." See, e.g., Fiorito v. California Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 340, 114 N.W.2d
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New York, through its insurance commissioners, attempted to
set up a standard form for all contracts of fire insurance made
within its boundaries. With periodic revisions, the form later
became known as the New York Standard Fire Policy.8 After a
subsequent revision of the form, many of the sister-states began to
adopt it.9  Although the standard form provides protection
"against all direct loss by fire," it does not attempt to define the
word "fire."
The general rule of construction for interpreting any clause
in an insurance policy states that such a clause is to be construed
against the insurer and in favor of the insured.'0  The majority of
the courts, however, still persist in holding that a fire must be
"hostile" before the insured may collect." Thus, the majority of
cases dealing with the standard policy have very simply defined
"direct" as meaning that loss which is caused by a fire of a hostile
nature.1 2 It follows, then, that insurance will cover the damage to
property if such damage is precipitated by a hostile fire. Yet, if
the fire is held to be of a "friendly" origin, there is generally no
policy coverage.
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
Austin v. Drew 3 is the first English case credited with creating
the "friendly-hostile fire doctrine." The plaintiff owned an eight-
661 (1962); L. L. Freeberg Pie Co. v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 244,
100 N.W.2d 753 (1960); Consoli v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 97 N.H. 224, 84
A.2d 926 (1952); Holmes v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 70 Ohio App.
239, 43 N.E.2d 746, 754 (1941). But see Wasserman v. Caledonian-American
Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 518, 95 N.E.2d 547 (1950); American Towing Co. v. Ger-
man Fire Inc. Co., 74 Md. 25, 21 Atl. 553 (1891).
8. See N. Y. INs. LAw. § 168.
9. E.g., PA. STAT. Am. tit. 40, § 636 (Supp. 1964). Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire and Texas, however, have their own standard
form. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636 (Supp. 1964) and S.D. CODE
ANN. ch. 31, § 31.24 (Supp. 1965), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65.011 (1957).
10. E.g., Hannon Motor Lines, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 214 F.Supp.
250 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Mach. Warehouse Corp., 212 F. Supp.
39 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Mode, Ltd. v Fireman's Fund Ins Co., 62 Idaho 270,
110 P.2d 840 (1941); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Boise St. Car Co., 52 Idaho 133,
11 P.2d 1090 (1932); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
412 Pa. 538, 194 A.2d 903 (1963); Lovering v. Erie Indem. Co., 412 Pa. 551,
195 A.2d 365 (1963); Dzurko v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 195 Pa. Super. 267, 171
A.2d 885 (1961).
11. E.g., Mode, Ltd. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P.2d
840 (1941); Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 531, 28
A.2d 803 (1942); Tannenbaum v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 127 Pa. Super.
278, 193 Atl. 305 (1937). See generally Note, 67 U. S. L. REv. 41 (1933);
Note, 37 YALE L. J. 264 (1927).
12. E.g., Tannenbaum v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 127 Pa. Super. 278,
193 Atl. 305 (1937); Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lanasa, 202 Va. 562,
118 S.E.2d 450 (1961). See Adams, Hostility Toward the "Hostile Fire"
Doctrine, 6 S.D.L.REv. 129, 134 (1961).
13. 4 Camp. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B. 1815).
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story sugar warehouse which was heated by means of a central
furnace. From the furnace a connecting chimney or flue ran into
the various storage rooms where the sugar was kept. Plaintiffs
would close the register at the top of the chimney each evening
when the fire was low and open the register in the morning
when the daily fire was made. On the morning of the accident
plaintiff's servant forgot to open the register. Consequently, the
chimney became overheated; smoke and sparks filled the ware-
house damaging the sugar. The three English reports in which
the Austin case is covered disagree on the exact facts of the case.
Taunton's report notes that:
• . . sparks and smoke had got into the rooms. The heat
had slightly blistered the walls, and considerably dis-
colored and damaged the sugar. There was much smoke,
but the only injury done to the sugars proceeded from
heat; the smoke would not have hurt them. Gibbs C.J.
directed the jury . . . it was not a loss by fire within the
meaning of the policy, but was occasioned by the improper
management of the register.14
The report by Holt reads:
No sensible damage resulted from the smoke and sparks.
... The fire is where it ought to be .... No substance,
therefore was taken possession of by the fire which was
not intended to be fuel for it; as the sparks and smoke
caused no mischief, but as the damage arose from an ex-
cess of heat in the rooms, occasioned by the register being
shut, I am of opinion that the plantiffs are not entitled
to recover. 15
Campbell's report, however, varies:
The sugars were very much damaged by the smoke, and
still more by the heat. . . . There was no more fire than
always exists. . . . Nothing was consumed by fire . . . the
fire was never excessive, and was always confined within
its proper limits. This was not a fire within the meaning
of the policy, nor a loss for which the company under-
takes.16
If the facts as reported by Taunton and Holt are taken to be
correct, the judgment rendered specifically excluded what the
result might have been if the case was one based entirely on
smoke damages. If so read, Austin would seem to be of little au-
thority for any subsequent case of smoke damage.
Seizing upon single phrases from one of the three reports,
reading them out of context and thereby seeking to mold them to
a particular situation has given rise to the general legal assump-
14. 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104 (C.P. 1816). (Emphasis added.)
15. Holt N.P. 126, 127, 171 Eng. Rep. 187 (K. B. 1815). (Emphasis
added.)
16. 4 Camp. 360, 361, 171 Eng. Rep. 115 (K. B. 1815). (Emphasis
added.)
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tion by the courts that the Austin case decided there was to be no
insurance damages for a fire which was confined in its ordinary
and rightful location, as in a stove or grate, regardless of the size,
nature or intensity of the fire itself.17 Although location is men-
tioned in Austin, it was by no means the sole criteria in the ruling.
There seems to be no logical reason for singling out locaton
rather than excess heat or ignition, the other two factors of im-
portance mentioned in Austin. In the final analysis, Austin v.
Drew was merely a case involving the overheating of sugar. On
its facts, it is but a simple refusal to apply the words "fire damage"
to overheating of sensitive goods by an ordinary fire and nothing
more.
It remained for an American court in Way v. Abbington Mutual
Fire Ins. Co.'8 to expressly coin the terms, "friendly" and "hostile"
fires. This case involved an action for insurance damages caused
by the ignition of soot in a chimney. In allowing recovery the
court said:
We are inclined to the opinion that a distinction should be
made between a fire intentionally lighted and main-
tained for a useful purpose in connection with the occupa-
tion of a building, and a fire which starts from such fire,
without human agency, in a place where fires are never
lighted nor maintained, although such ignition may nat-
urally be expected to occur occasionally, as an incident to
the maintenance of necessary fires, and although the
place where it occurs is constructed with a view to pre-
vent damage from such ignition. A fire in a chimney
should be considered rather a hostile fire, than a friendly
fire, and as such, if it causes damages, it is within the pro-
visions of ordinary contracts of fire insurance.19
Even though this case was decided correctly in favor of the in-
sured, the court proceeded to endow each fire with a distinct per-
sonality and a character of its own producing irreparable harm
and utter confusion to the insurance law.20
17. See Spare v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 137 Conn. 105, 74 A.2d 204 (1950);
see generally 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 3082 (1941); Morrison, Concern-
ing Friendly Fires, 3 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 15 (1961).
18. 116 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
19. Id. at 69, 43 N.E. at 1033. Accord, Washington Mut. Fire & Light-
ning Ins. Ass'n. v. Sherer, 32 Ohio App. 465, 168 N.E. 234 (1927).
20. See Morrison, supra note 17. Generally a "hostile" fire is one
which has escaped its normal confines. It is an unexpected, unintentional
fire not anticipated as such in a place where fire is not ordinarily main-
tained. Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. of America, 150 Pa. Super.
531, 28 A.2d 803 (1942). A "friendly" fire, however, is usually defined as
being a fire lighted and contained in a usual place for fire, such as a furnace,
stove or incinerator, and used for the purpose of heating, cooking, manu-
facturing or other common and usual everyday purpose. Tannenbaum v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 127 Pa. Super. 278, 193 Atl. 305 (1937). If a fire
which is originally friendly escapes, and becomes hostile, generally speak-
ing, recovery will be allowed for loss or damage resulting thereby. Mitchell
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The 1941 English case of Harris v. Poland2 1 did much to
clarify the modern English viewpoint in this area of fire insurance
law. Here the plaintiff, who was an elderly lady, had had her
apartment burglarized several times. In order to prevent the
theft of further personal items, she decided to hide her jewelry in
a fire grate among sticks and paper used for lighting the fire.
She later forgot where she had placed the jewelry and proceeded
to light a fire in the grate, which in turn burned the jewelry.
Plaintiff tried to collect under the fire insurance policy which
specifically insured the contents of her apartment against fire.
The insurer resisted, not on the grounds of negligence by the
plaintiff, but rather on the contention that the policy was only
intended to cover loss by fire occurring in places where no fire
was intended. The court refused to read such a limiting provi-
sion into the policy and further noted that since the direct cause of
the loss was the fire, it was immaterial that the fire was enabled
to operate owing to the very negligence of the insured. 22
[W]hen the ordinary man insures against loss by fire, he
believes that he is insuring against every kind of loss
which he may suffer from the more or less compulsory
fire .... Am I not covered, he would ask, if the wind
blows something-say a valuable manuscript or sheet of
foreign stamps-into the fire in the grate, or if a careless
servant drops something into the fire, or if my wife stum-
bles and causes her lace scarf or silver fox tie to get
caught in the fire grate? 2
3
The Harris case, then, would not go so far as to say that all
damage is recoverable under a fire insurance policy. Instead, it
would only allow recovery where there has been actual ignition
by a friendly fire.
v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., supra. See generally 29A AM. JUR. Insurance
§ 1287 (1960).
In Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 CONN. BAR J. 289 (1927), Professor Vance
lists three elements necessary for a friendly fire to occur; (1) the fire must
have been intentionally kindled; (2) it must be confined to the place where
it was intended to be; and (3) it must not be excessive. In PATTERSON,
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANcE LAW 246-47 (1957), however, it is observed that:
Since most 'friendly' fires are confined to containers, we may
define a 'hostile' fire as one that escapes from the container in
which it was started and to which it is ordinarily confined....
While one court [O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 122
N.W. 1038 (1909) ] has held that any excessively hot fire that causes
damage outside the container (stove or furnace) is covered by the
policy, the argument that the container rule, because of its certainty,
will in the long run avoid wasteful litigation (e.g. to determine
what is 'excessive' fire) and thus be most beneficial to the insuring
public has almost universally prevailed.
21. [1941] 1 All. E. R. 204.
22. Id. at 206.
23. Id. at 208. Accord, Bentley v. Lumberman's Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 276,
43 Atl. 209 (1899).
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Justice Cardozo, in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,2 4
explained that the extent to which property was covered under
the ordinary fire insurance policy is determined by the intentions
of ordinary businessmen when the initial contract was made. The
rule of proximate cause should only be applied when it tended to
indicate what losses the businessman would ordinarily think he
should be protected against.25  It is submitted that this type of
reasoning is, in essence, what the modern Harris v. Poland case
hopes to achieve. Unfortunately, however, the American courts
still persist in paying unwavering loyalty and homage to a mis-
guided interpretation of Austin v. Drew and to the conceptualism
of Way v. Abbington Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
THE MODERN APPROACH
It would appear that the general American rule regarding the
application of the friendly-hostile fire doctrine is that where fire
is either employed as an agent for ordinary heating purposes, for
manufacturing purposes or as a mere instrument of art, the in-
surer will not be held liable for the consequences arising there-
from.26 This is so, of course, so long as the actual fire is confined
within the limits of the agencies employed. It is only where a
fire assumes a "hostile" nature by accidentally escaping its in-
tended bounds that the insurer will be held lable to cover the re-
sulting damage. The accidental quality must attach to the fire
24. 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
25. Id. at 51, 120 N.E. at 89-90; Marks v. Lumbermen's Ins. Co., 160
Pa. Super. 66, 49 A.2d 855 (1947). Words used in insurance contracts are to
be interpreted according to their plain and ordinary sense so as to give ef-
fect to the intention of the parties. Yerise v. Employees Fire Ins. Co.,
172 Kan. 111, 238 P.2d 472 (1951); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 153 Md.
253, 138 Atl. 33 (1927). When the insurer takes into consideration the cus-
toms and usages of the particular trade, the courts should endeavor to inter-
pret the policy itself with adequate evaluation of the customs. Sterling
Fire Ins. Co. v. Comision Reguladora Del. Mercado De Hanequen, 195 Ind. 29,
143 N.E. 2d (1924); Yost v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 38 Pa. Super. 594 (1909).
Yet, in Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Porter, 225 Ky. 280, 8 S.W.2d 408 (1928)
and Runyan v. Runyan, 101 Ark. 353, 142 S.W. 519 (1912), it was held that
customs and usages were inadmissible as evidence to vary the terms of an
insurance policy where the terms of the policy were clear and unambiguous.
Accord, Consoli v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 97 N.H. 224, 226, 84 A.2d 926,
927 (1952).
26. See Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson, 47 F. Supp. 90 (S. D.
Idaho 1942); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 23 Ala. App.
126, 121 So. 906 (1929); Lavitt v. Hartford Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105
Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572 (1927); Mutual Fire Ins. Agency of Louisville v.
Slatter & Gilroy Inc., 265 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1954); McDonald v. Royal Ins.
Co., 98 Mont. 572, 40 P.2d 1005 (1934); Corywell v. Old Colony Ins. Co.,
118 Neb. 303, 229 N.W. 326 (1930); Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co.,
150 Pa. Super. 531, 28 A.2d 803 (1943); Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v.
Reciprocal Exch., 109 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See generally
Note, 57 L. Q. REv. 461 (1941).
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itself, and not to the damage or loss.2 7
It has been held that when a fire formerly contained in a
stove or furnace spreads or escapes from its intended place of con-
finement, it becomes "hostile" in nature.28  Recovery is accordingly
granted to the insured for subsequent damage caused by smoke,
soot or heat from the fire in such cases.2 9 In the leading case of
Collins v. Delaware Ins. Co.,3 0 the insured suffered damage caused
by heavy smoke and soot emitting from an uncontrolled fire in a
stove. The fire spread to an oil tank. The court allowed recovery
from the insurer under a standard fire insurance policy noting:
The fuel was oil and was intended to be consumed in a
particular place, namely by a wick fed from a tank in
which the oil was kept. It was no more intended to be
burned in the tank than in the barrel or the can in which
it was brought to the house and kept. If some malicious
or careless person had dropped a match in the tank, or if
the tank had leaked and the oil reached some part of the
stove where it was not intended to be, and in either case
there had been an ignition, and furniture in the room had
been damaged by smoke and soot, could there be any ques-
tion that the efficient cause of the injury was a fire 'out of
place'? We think not.3 1
Similarly, in Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co.,32 the
insured's furnace exploded causing hot coals to be ejected onto
the basement floor with the subsequent smoke and soot damages.
In allowing recovery, the court observed:
If live burning coals were ejected upon the floor of the
basement, then such fire was a hostile element that had
escaped from its place of confinement, and from which
damage could arise either by consuming plaintiff's prop-
erty or by damaging it by smoke or soot. In either case,
there would be a loss or damage by fire.33
27. See Adams, Hostility Toward the "Hostile Fire" Doctrine, 6 S.D.L.
REv. 129, 135 (1961). See generally 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 3082 (1941);
19 COUCH, INSURANCE § 42.2 (2d ed. 1959).
28. Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 150 Pa. Supp. 531, 28 A.2d
803 (1942).
29. See City of N.Y. Ins. Co. v. Gugenheim, 7 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928). Here fire from the oil furnace escaped into the blower system.
The smoke and soot from this "hostile fire" proceeded through the air
vents into insured's house. The walls, fixtures and furniture were dam-
aged. The court allowed recovery. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Armstrong, 219 Ala. 208, 122 So. 23 (1929); Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire
& Liability Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641 (1926). But see Levert-St.
John Ins. Co. v. Birmingham Fire & Cas. Co., 137 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1961).
30. 9 Pa. Super. 576 (1899).
31. Id. at 580.
32. 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S.W. 490 (1924).
33. Id. at 36, 260 S.W. at 491. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,
219 Ala. 209, 122 So. 23 (1929); Fire Ass'n. of Philadelphia v. Nelson, 90
Colo. 524, 10 P.2d 943 (1932); New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Rupard,
187 Ky. 671, 220 S.W. 538 (1920); Washington Twp. Mut. Fire & Lightning
Ins. Ass'n. v. Sherrer, 32 Ohio App. 465, 168 N.E. 234 (1927). Cf. Mitchell
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On the other hand, when a friendly fire in a stove or furnace,
whch does not escape from its intended place of confinement, be-
comes excessive and unsuitable for its intended purpose and loca-
tion, the courts have generally refused recovery.3 4 Although a
fire was found to have forced the door of the plaintiff's furnace
open, causing smoke and soot to fill his store and thereby in turn
causing damage to his merchandise, the court in Pacific Fire Ins.
Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co.,3 5 nonetheless refused to allow the plain-
tiff a recovery. There was no combustion of any type outside of
the furnace and the flames outside of the furnace failed to ignite
or burn any merchandise. The court concluded that since the
damage was caused by smoke, soot and fly-ash which originated
from a friendly fire, the loss was not within the terms contem-
plated by the insurance contract.36
Moreover, in Canon v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,37 plaintiff's stove pipe,
which extended through the second story of a building that he
owned, became disengaged from the central heating unit on the
ground floor and, consequently, forced smoke and soot into the
second story of the building causing much damage to the mer-
chandise stored there. Refusing to allow recovery, the court noted
that there was no fire in or about the building, except in the
stove where it was intended to be built, and that the fire in ques-
tion had not spread from the place where it was intended to re-
main. Hence, the fire was to be considered a friendly, and not a
hostile, fire.38  The court, however, observed that when a fire
v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 531, 28 A.2d 803 (1942); Prog-
ress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Exch., 109 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937).
It is most interesting to note that at common law the liability of an
occupier of land for damage done to the property of another by the escape
of fire appears to have been strict. The only defenses were that the escape
was caused by the act of the plaintiff, the act of a stranger or the act of God.
See 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 385 (1923); POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 528 n.1 (1911); PROSSER, TORTS (3d ed.
1964). A possible fourth defense was that the fire was of an unknown
origin. The general presumption, however, was that the fire originating on
the premises was kindled by the occupier and was his own fire. Becquet v.
MacCarty, 2 B & Ad 951, 109 Eng. Rep. 1396 (1831). See Surton, Liability
for Escape of Fire, 34 N.Z.L.J. 87 (1958).
34. Spare v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 137 Conn. 105, 75 A.2d 64 (1950);
First Nat'l Bank v. Royal Indem. Co., 193 Iowa 221, 186 N.W. 934 (1922);
McGraw v. Home Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 482, 144 Pac. 821 (1914); Consoli v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 97 N.H. 224, 84 A.2d 926 (1957). See 5 APPLEMAN
INSURANCE § 3082 (1941).
35. 47 F. Supp. 90 (S. D. Idaho 1942).
36. Id. at 92-93. This case smacks of a misinterpretation of Austin v.
Drew. See Lavitt v. Hartford Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 AtI.
572 (1927); Sigourney Produce Co. v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 211
Iowa 1203, 235 N.W. 284 (1931); Salmon v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 53
R.I. 154, 165 Atl. 214 (1933).
37. 110 Ga. 563, 35 S.E. 775 (1900).
38. Id. at 564, 35 S.E. at 776.
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breaks out from its intended place and becomes a hostile element
by ignition, even though not in fact actually burning insured
property but damaging it by smoke or heat, money damages are
recoverable from the insurer.39
No court-made rule, regardless of how strongly rooted in age
by fundamental principles of stare decisis and momentary logic,
will be able to withstand all the rigors of forever changing modern
legal concepts. Exceptions to the rule must, on occasion, be made
and Corywell v. Old Colony Ins. Co. 40 was just such an exception.
Here flames up to five feet flared from the door of an oil furnace.
The plaintiff's entire house was filled with smoke, soot and vapor-
ized oil. In a 4-3 decision the court allowed recovery for the plain-
tiff-insured stating that when it is clearly proved that loss was
caused by a fire which had escaped from the place of its intended
confinement, the fire becomes hostile and the insurance company
is liable. 41 It is interesting to note, however, that the central fire
never escaped totally from its place of confinement; rather its
flames were directed outside the intended area due to an internal
combustion in an oil furnace. It, therefore, should have been
considered as friendly in origin. The excessive nature of the fire
was not even argued conclusively and there was no actual burning
of anything in plaintiff's house. Thus, the final decision rests not
on clear legal reasoning but apparently on a weak policy decision
by the courts to make the party with the "deepest pocket" suffer
the liability.
Owens v. Milwaukee Ins. Co.,42 is truly representative of the
narrow judicial attitude taken toward the friendly-hostile fire doc-
trine. In this rather humorous case, the plaintiff inadvertently
threw her lower partial denture into a trash fire which she had
started in her own yard. She contended that the insurer was
bound to reimburse her for this loss because her insurance policy
provided that "all direct loss or damage by fire" was fully covered.
She contended that the policy itself made no distinction whatso-
ever between "friendly" and "hostile" fires and that losses caused
by "friendly" fires were specifically excluded in the policy. In
essence, then, it made no difference what name was given to the
destructive fire; for in either case, the loss would still be the direct
result of a fire and thereby included within the policy coverage.
43
Furthermore, since the law of the forum held contracts of insur-
ance were to be liberally construed in the insured's favor, the
phrase "all direct loss or damage by fire" should be taken to in-
39. Ibid.
40. 118 Neb. 312, 229 N.W. 326 (1930).
41. Id. at 314, 229 N.W. at 327-28. Compare O'Connor v. Queen Ins.
Co., 104 Wis. 338, 122 N.E. 1038 (1909) with Cobbel v. Milwaukee Mechanics'
Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S.W. 490 (1924).
42. 125 Ind. App. 208, 123 N.E.2d 645 (1955).
43. Id. at 210, 123 N.E.2d at 647.
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clude both "friendly" and "hostile" fires.44 The Owens court,
nonetheless, felt itself bound by the overwhelming weight of au-
thority and denied recovery, holding that a fire was not a fire
within the meaning of an insurance policy if it occurred where it
was intended to be. Thus, the Indiana court followed the seem-
ingly ridiculous self-imposed rule of determining liability for fire
damage on the ground only of location.45
The attitude of insurance companies towards fire claims was
greatly sharpened by the depression. Where once there had been
an air of benevolent liberalism, now all was changed practically
overnight into an attitude of extremely cautious scrutinization. 46
In order to stop the deluge of cigarette burn claims, the National
Board of Fire Underwriters in 1933 instructed its members to
refuse payment of such claims.47 After several test cases refused
to grant recovery, 48 a novel approach to the problem was taken in
Swerling v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. 49 Here a cigarette, falling
from an ash tray, burned through a carpet destroying an area one
and one-half inches in length and one-half inch in width. The
court granted recovery:
The cigarette was not the container of fire. It was com-
posed of tobacco and container and both were burning. It
was the fire itself .... If while the cigarette is lighted,
the person desires to put it aside temporarily or to discard
it, he may put it in an ash tray or some other suitable
receptacle. The burning cigarette is then confined in a
place where it is intended to be. As long as the cigarette
remains there, the fire in the cigarette is a friendly fire
and for any damage it might cause while in its proper
place, there can be no recovery. But, if through accident,
the cigarette gets on the floor and causes damage to a rug
by charring or scorching it, the fire in the cigarette is no
longer a friendly fire, but is a hostile one, because it is
then in an improper place and therefore is doing harm. 0
Some positive action must be taken to remedy the current
problems arising over the insistence of most courts to classify a
fire either as "friendly" or "hostile." An award for damages under
a standard fire insurance policy claim should not depend on such
a distinction. 51
44. Id. at 211, 123 N.E.2d at 647-48.
45, Ibid. But see Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La.
App. 1935) ; O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 388, 122 N.W. 1038 (1909).
. 46. See Ackerman, What Is a Fire? - An Insurance Definition, 2 U.
NEWARK L. REV. 111, 142 (1937).
47. Id. at 143.
48. Ibid.
49. 55 R. I. 252, 180 Atl. 343 (1935).
50. Id. at 253, 180 Atl. at 344.
51. But see Pew, Insurance-Friendly & Hostile Fires, 33 TEx. L.
REV. 954, 956 (1955).
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THE SOLUTIONS
The solutions to the problem generally suggested are: (1)
abolition of the rule;5 -2 (2) gradual break from the traditionally
rigid approach of attempting to define "fire" and instead endeavor
to find a workable definition of "fire damage" - or that element
which the insured himself is most interested in learning about;5
(3) use the rule in Austin v. Drew, as clarified by Harris v.
Poland, as a rule of construction to aid in determining the prob-
able intention of the parties when the insurance contract is en-
tered into, rather than a rule of law limiting the insurer's liabil-
ity.54 If this were to be followed, recovery, then, would be
permitted where there was an actual burning of the insured
article. In such a case there would indeed, from a realistic view-
point, be a hostile fire; (4) do not abolish the "friendly-hostile"
fire doctrine, but broaden it to include a consideration of the kind
of fire in addition to the location of the fire. Thus, in determining
whether a certain loss by smoke, soot or heat is caused by a hos-
tile fire, the court would consider the location of the fire-whether
in fact it was not confined to the place where it was so intended.
It would then investigate the kind or type of fire, determining
whether the fire was excessive or unsuitable for its intended
purpose;5 (5) develop a receptive atmosphere in the states for the
inclusion, by legislative action, of deduction clauses to standard
fire insurance policies. The accomplishment of this purpose would
be greatly advanced if the guiding principles enunciated in O'Con-
nor v. Queen Ins. Co.,57 were used by the court as a framework in
reaching its determinations. Here a servant lighted a fire in his
master's furnace with paper and oil. A violent fire within the
furnace caused smoke, soot and excessive heat to fill the house.
The court held that the damage to the house from excessive heat
was recoverable, even though the fire was contained in its proper
place.58 The O'Connor case appears to have established two cri-
teria for determining whether loss by smoke, soot and heat was
caused by a "hostile fire." Location and kind of fire, i.e., where
was the fire and was it excessive or unsuitable for the intended
purpose.59
52. Adams, Hostility Toward the "Hostile Fire" Doctrine, 6 S. D. L.
REV. 129 (1961). "Kill the offending varmint rather than . . . catch him
and pull his fanges." Id. at 135-36.
53. MacIntyre, Hostile & Friendly Fires in Canadian Insurance Law
2 U. BRITISH COLUMBIA L. NoTEs 373, 380 (1950).
54. Faggart, Application of the Hostile Fire - Friendly Fire Rule,
30 N. C. L. REV. 431, 436 (1952);Morrison, Concerning Friendly Fires, 3 B.
C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 15, 28 (1961); Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 CONN. B. J.
284, 293 (1927).
55. Kerr, Hostile & Friendly Fires, 32 ORE. L. REV. 69, 75-77 (1952).
56. Adam, supra note 52, at 135-36.
57. 140 Wis. 388, 122 N.E. 1038 (1909).
58. Id. at 390, 122 N.E. at 1039.
59. Ibid.
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Furthermore, the extent to which any piece of property is
covered under an ordinary fire insurance policy should be deter-
mined by the intentions of the parties when the contract is made.60
When an insured purchases a fire insurance policy, he wants in-
surance against any accidental loss by fire. Insurance is sold to
laymen, not to experts in the field; where there is smoke, there is
fire.6 '
Effective state legislation setting up standard deductible limi-
tation clauses on fire losses would also be ideal. The courts
could completely free themselves from the tedious and very
strained application of the "friendly-hostile" fire doctrine. Few
state legislatures could effectively solve the problem in view of
the heavy insurance lobby. Hence, legislation of this type would
never get reported out of committee. It appears that the best solu-
tion would be to re-evaluate the misconstrued case of Austin v.
Drew in terms of Harris v. Poland and O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.
Perhaps Lavitt v. Hartford Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,62 presents
one of the strongest arguments in support of retaining the "friend-
ly-hostile" fire doctrine. Here the court noted:
While the use of the term 'hostile fire' does suggest super-
ficially, any fire which by getting beyond control or op-
erating in a manner different from that expected or de-
signed causes damage . . . yet when fully considered, it be-
comes obvious that the wide range of circumstances upon
which liability would thus depend [under such a defini-
tion] would tend to render each case mostly a law unto
itself and introduce elements of great uncertainty in de-
termining the rights of the parties. . . . Though the pres-
ent distinction may seem arbitrary, yet it is of long stand-
ing, makes for certainty in the ascertainment of rights, and
has been acted upon in the writing of so vast a number of
insurance contracts throughout this country that its
soundness may not, at this time, be questioned.6 3
It is most commendable for the Lavitt court to be searching
for a common thread of legal development and stability in these
fire insurance cases. Nonetheless, it would appear that the courts
have sacrificed established principles of individual justice for a
principle of judicial group conformity.
It is suggested that the courts re-examine Austin and adopt a
policy similar to Harris v. Poland and O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.
so that the intention of parties can be given effect according to the
layman's definition of fire: where there is smoke, there is fire.
60. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 51, 120 N.E. 86,
89 (1918).
61. See Adams, supra note 52, at 135-36.
62. 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572 (1927).
63. Id. at 733, 136 Atl. at 575. See Pew, Insurance - Friendly &
Hostile Fires, 33 TEx. L. REV. 954, 956 (1955) (distinction between friendly
and hostile fires has a reasonable basis).
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